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tion and the principle of a group of friendly, co-operating nations, all equal in sovereignty and in dignity in the eye of the world's law, however varied they may be in resources and in power.

That with which we are at war, therefore, is not a people or a race, but an idea. We should have had to be at war with that idea no matter what people or what race had acted as its agents. If this idea of world-domination had been adopted by Italy, and if Italy had attacked the world in its interest, we should be at war with Italy. If this idea of world-domination had been adopted by Japan, and if Japan had attacked the world in its interest, we should be at war with Japan. If this idea of world-domination had been adopted by Russia, and if Russia had attacked the world in its interest, we should be at war with Russia. But as a matter of fact this idea was adopted by Germany, and it was Germany which attacked the world in its interest; therefore we are at war with Germany.

The road to durable peace begins at the point where this false notion of world-domination is given up once for all. Commercial interpenetration, financial control, and military dominance are the three forms in which the lust for world-power manifests itself. A free world made up of independent, liberty-loving nations must combine to prevent any one of these. The liberty-loving nations have almost with unanimity now combined in this war for that very purpose.

A false idea is not really conquered until it is overthrown in the minds of those who have entertained it. What we must reach, therefore, is the mind, the conscience, and the heart of the German people. We must by military defeat compel them to leave off looking for new worlds to conquer, and turn their thought inward to prepare the way for those same ideas of co-operation between nations, of the sacredness of treaty obligations, of the rights of small nations, and of the duties of great powers toward submerged nationalities, which are now part of the mental furniture of liberty-minded men and women throughout the world. If in 1848 the aspirations of so large a portion of the German people had not been disappointed and crushed, the history of the past fifty years might have been written in letters of gold instead of in letters of so much blood.

It has been plain, since the battle of the Marne, that Germany and her allies could not win this war. The history of the conflict from September 6, 1914, has been one of varying fortunes, but viewed in the largest possible way, it is a history of slow but sure German defeat. The amazing exhibition of military power made by France and by the citizen-soldiers of Great Britain has been adequate to hold in check the enormous and highly trained armies of the Central Empires. Distress, unhappiness, and grave doubt as to the outcome and issues of the war are now widespread in Germany and in Austria-Hungary. All these facts contribute to the breaking-down of the zeal for world-domination and increase the chance of a durable peace to follow the war.

The terms of that peace have been stated at intervals for three and one-half years past by some of the leading responsible statesmen of the world. The early declarations of Mr. Asquith and of M. Briand could hardly be improved. The later ones of the Prime Minister of England and of the President of the United

States have awakened resounding echoes throughout the world and have been listened to even by the peoples with whom we are at war. It is quite idle, however, to talk of a negotiated peace if by that we mean a peace that shall leave the vital issues of the war unsettled. The result would be not a peace but an armistice. This would last until our children, or our children's children, armed to the teeth and bearing meanwhile the crushing burden of huge military establishments, took up again the task that we laid down without having carried it to accomplishment. That would not be a fortunate or an honorable legacy for this generation to leave to its successors. We must persist with steadfastness and with all possible speed until the war is definitively won, and until our enemies admit that they have lost in the combat which they forced upon the world.

When that end has been accomplished, the world will have traveled a long way on the road toward a durable peace. While it is true that the coming international organization and the coming international economic relationships will powerfully aid in establishing and maintaining peace, yet after all, the main thing is to remove from the world a notion and a purpose that compel armaments and that eventually force war. That notion and that purpose are those of world-domination. The cry, *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*, comes from a shallow mind and from a hardened heart. The alternative to *Weltmacht* is not *Niedergang*. It is rather membership in a family of nations, each one of which is possessed of what I have described as the international mind. This is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world.

Given this, and it will be easy to establish and maintain an international organization to keep the peace of the world, as well as to establish and maintain international economic relationships that shall promote human happiness and human satisfaction. Without this condition, all schemes for international organization and international co-operation are futile and will not long ward off a disaster which takes its origin in wrong and false ideas planted in the hearts of men and nations.

THE WAR OF IDEALS AND THE WAY OUT

By WILLIAM E. BORAH*

THIS is not, as most previous wars have been, a war merely of armies; it is a war of nations; it is a contention and a conflict between whole peoples, and not merely between great armies.

In former times, until the Revolution in France, wars were carried on by armies, which were often employed and dissociated or disunited in a marked degree at least

* Portions of an address delivered by Senator Borah before the Senate, March 18, 1918, in connection with the Department of Agriculture Appropriation Bill.

from the nation itself. The war went forward and the battles were fought without very much strain or without very much readjustment of the national life. But this conflict is distinctly a war between nations. It is one people pitted against another. It calls for the resources and the energies and the powers of the people as a whole. No man in this contest can be indifferent to the situation upon the theory that he is not geared up to some activity in connection with the war. Whether he is upon the farm, in the workshop, in the factory, or in the law office, he is in some measure contributing, if he is doing his duty; or, if he is not doing his duty, he is menacing this great conflict in which we are now engaged.

Let us reflect upon this situation as it now confronts us. It will appear more conclusively that this is a war between the nations, and the question of victory depends upon which is best organized and best united in spirit and in purpose, industrially and economically. That question will determine who shall win this great conflict.

Germany is now in possession of middle Europe. Bulgaria, Roumania, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and a large portion of Russia are as completely a part of the German Empire as if national lines were wiped out. She has already realized one of the great objects and purpose of entering this war, which was to establish a middle Europe, to get control of the vast resources in the center of the continent, and place herself practically in a fortified fortress in the middle of Europe. That is now largely a realization. While we still speak of Austria-Hungary and Turkey and Bulgaria and Roumania, they are as a matter of fact a part of the German Empire, and all orders proceed from Berlin.

The Kaiser is controlling the destinies of those nations as if they had been incorporated as a part of his Empire. Germany is taking possession day by day of the resources of Russia; she either has, or will have before very many months shall have passed, control of all that portion of Russia which she desires to control. With her capacity for organization, her transcendent aptitude for efficiency, in control of middle Europe, and with the natural resources of Russia behind her, this is not, indeed, a war between armies, but a war of nations. It will be determined according to the manner in which we organize ourselves industrially and agriculturally; how we stand economically, and how, as a people, we are united in spirit and in purpose.

You may put upon the western front all the soldiers that you can build ships to carry, but if there is not behind them a united and determined people, aroused and thoroughly understanding the fact that we are all a part of the contest, we shall not be able to succeed in the end. We could do nothing in this contest that would more discourage the German dynasty than to demonstrate once and for all that we are a thoroughly united people, determined to sacrifice whatever it is necessary to sacrifice in order to crush the military power of that people.

And when we reflect further on some of the issues which are involved in the war, we are again led to understand how conclusively this is a contest between the two systems of government, two civilizations. We ought to get away, if we can, from the idea that it is a question of the redistribution of territory in Europe; that it is a

question of securing compensation for injuries which have been done us; and understand that, whatever the cause was in the beginning, we have now arrived at a point where it is distinctly a conflict between two systems of government, between peoples and nations, and that one or the other will have to go down.

I read yesterday in the *New York Times* an article appearing within the last thirty days in a leading paper published in Germany, one of the responsible journals of that country, in which it discusses the things that it will be necessary for the United States to concede in the readjustment after the war. Among others, it declares unalterably against the Monroe doctrine, and that neither Germany nor the other European countries with which Germany is associated can longer submit to that doctrine. It also declares against the immigration laws which inhibit certain immigrants coming to this country. Among other things, this article says:

Our leaders builded better than they knew in their decision for unrestricted submarine warfare in that they thus voted that in the name of all Europe our people should confront the Yankeeism hidden in the Monroe doctrine, as if the nations of Europe could in future be excluded from those advantages which Columbus, by his discovery of America, opened up for all time to the civilized world. How little till now has Europe comprehended that the Monroe doctrine in its last analysis signifies nothing less than this.

The war was always, to our way of thinking, a war against America even before it came to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the declaration of a state of war. Nobody doubts that we should have been able much earlier to conclude a favorable peace if the American means of assistance had been at our disposal in the same measure as they have been at the disposal of our enemies or if they had been denied to them as they have been to us. So much more is America, since her openly declared participation in the war, our chief enemy, who alone can galvanize our other enemies to new and bolder resistance. If we can only emerge from this war unvanquished, without giving securities and indemnities, this alone is equivalent to stigmatizing the whole Anglo-Saxon race. The nations who today believe in that race will, when they understand this fact, awake from the trance that let them work and fight so long for the Anglo-Saxon world dominion. In a higher sense even this world war is a war for the faith. There will be no salvation for Anglo-Saxon dominion, either in the British Empire or in America if this process of "crushing" miscarries, to say nothing of the result if it ends in a debacle of the entente.

In other words, whatever may have been our opinion in the beginning of the war, both sides realize now that this is not only a war between great nations, involving the interests of all their citizens, but that it is distinctly a war between systems of government, and it is so recognized.

One German historian, Professor Meyer, in a book written since the beginning of the war in which he sums up the issues involved, or rather the issue because it all resolves itself into one, uses this language:

The truth of the whole matter undoubtedly is that the time has arrived when two distinct forms of State organization must face each other in a life-and-death struggle.

That is undoubtedly the understanding and belief of those who are responsible for this war. It is coming to be the understanding and belief of those who have had the war forced upon them. We have finally put aside the tragedy at the Bosnian capital and the wrongs inflicted upon Belgium as the moving causes of the war. They were but the prologue to the imperial theme. We

now see and understand clearly and unmistakably the cause at all times lying back of these things. Upon the one hand is Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the principles of human liberty which they embody and preserve. Upon the other hand is that peculiar form of State organization which, in the language of the Emperor, rests alone upon the strength of the army and whose highest creed finds expression in the words of one of its greatest advocates that war is a part of the eternal order instituted by God. We go back to Runnymede, where fearless men wrenched from the hands of power *habeas corpus* and the trial by jury. They point us to Breslau and Molwitz, where Frederick the Great, in violation of his plighted word, inaugurated the rule of fraud and force and laid the foundation for that mighty structure whose central and dominating principle is that of power.

It is that power with which we are at war today. Shall men, shall the people, be governed by some remorseless and soulless entity softly called the "State" or shall the instrumentalities of government yield alone and at all times to the wants and necessities, the hopes and aspirations of the masses? That is now the issue. Nothing should longer conceal it. It is but another and more stupendous phase of the old struggle, a struggle as ancient and as inevitable as the thirst for power and the love of liberty, a struggle in which men have fought and sacrificed all the way from Marathon to Verdun.

It seems strange now, and it will seem more extraordinary to those who come after us, that we did not recognize from the beginning that this was the issue. But, obscured by the débris of European life, confused with the dynastic quarrels and racial bitterness of the Old World, it was difficult to discern, and still more difficult to realize, that the very life of our institutions was at stake, that the scheme of the enemy, amazing and astounding, was not alone to control territory and dominate commerce, but to change the drift of human progress and to readjust the standards of the world's civilization. Perhaps, too, our love of peace, our traditional friendship for all nations lulled suspicion and discouraged inquiry. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt now. Whatever the cause, however perverse the fates which brings us to this crisis, we are called upon not to settle questions of territory or establish new spheres of national activity, but to defend the institutions under which we live. Who doubts should we fail that the whole theory and system of government for which we have labored and struggled, our whole conception of civilization would be discredited utterly? Who but believes that should we lose militarism would be the searching test of all governments and that the world would be an armed camp harried and tortured and decimated by endless wars? No; we can no longer doubt the issue, and, notwithstanding some discouraging facts, we must not doubt the result. We are simply meeting the test which brave men have met before, for this issue has been fought over and over again for 3,000 years. Islam's fanaticism was grounded in the same design and made of the same stuff, but it broke upon the valor of Charles Martel's men at Tours. But the conflict was not conclusive. The elder Napoleon was obsessed by the same dream of world dominion, the same passion for military glory that now

obsesses those against whom we war. But he, too, saw his universal scepter depart when change and fate which sometimes war on the side of liberty turned from him on the field of Waterloo. And now the issue is again made up, and again this dream of world dominion, this passion for military glory torments the souls of our would-be masters. And now again somewhere on the battle-fields of Europe the same fate awaits the hosts of irresponsible power. In such a contest and with such an issue we cannot lose; it would not harmonize with the law of human progress.

It has been the proud belief of some that not only would this war result in greater prestige and greater security for free institutions, but that it would effectuate the spread of democracy throughout Europe. We all hope for great things, for we believe in the ultimate triumph of free institutions, but we must not expect these things out of hand. The broken sobs of nations struggling to be independent and free so often heard in that part of the world, and then heard no more; the story of Russia just now being written in contention and blood, admonish us anew that the republican road to safety and stability is encompassed by all kinds of trials and beset by countless perils. Democracy is the severest test of character which can be put upon a people, and must be earned and acquired in the right school of experience. It cannot be handed whole and complete to any people, though every member of the community were a Socrates. But what we have determined in this crisis, as I understand it, is that we will keep the road of democracy open. No one shall close it. If any nation shall hereafter rise to the sublime requirement of self-government and choose to go that way it shall have the right to do so. Above all things, we have determined, cost what it may in treasure and blood, that this experiment here upon this Western Continent shall justify the faith of its builders, and there shall remain here in all the integrity of its powers, neither wrenched nor marred by the passions of war from within nor humbled nor dishonored by military power from without, the Republic of the fathers. That since the challenge has been thrown down that this is a war unto death between two opposing theories of government we are determined that whatever else happens as a result of this war this form of organization, this theory of state, this last great hope, this fruition of 130 years of struggle and toil "shall not perish from the earth."

So, sir, stripped of all incidental and confusing things, the problem which our soldiers will help to solve is whether the theory of government exemplified in the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns or the theory of government exemplified in the faith of Abraham Lincoln shall prevail. It is after all a war of ideas, a clash of systems, a death struggle of ideals. Amid the sacrifice of war it is our belief that the old order passeth. In such a contest there is little room for compromise. We can no more quit than Washington could have quit at Valley Forge. We can no more compromise than Lincoln could have compromised after Chancellorsville. We can and should keep the issue clear of all selfish and imperialistic ambitions, but the issue itself cannot be compromised. Cost what it may in treasure and blood, the burden, as if by fate, has been laid upon us, and we must meet it manfully and successfully. To compromise is to

acknowledge defeat. The policies of Frederick the Great, which would make of all human souls mere cogs in a vast military machine, and the policies of Washington, which would make government the expression and the instrument of popular power, are contending for supremacy on the battle-fields of Europe. Just that single, simple, stupendous issue, beside which all other issues in this war are trivial, must have a settlement as clear and conclusive as the settlement at Runnymede or Yorktown. To lose sight of this fact is to miss the supreme purpose of the war and to permit is to be embarrassed or belittled by questions of territory is to betray the cause of civilization. And to fail to settle it clearly and conclusively is to fail in the most vital and sublime task ever laid upon a people.

THE ALLEGED MENACE OF JAPAN IN THE PHILIPPINES

By J. T. SUNDERLAND, D. D.

Author of "Rising Japan"

FROM certain sources we have been told almost numberless times during the past half-dozen years that we are in danger of losing the Philippines at the hands of Japan. Just at the present moment, since the United States and Japan happen to be allies in war, it is conceded that probably the peril is temporarily suspended—Japan would hardly venture to invade territory belonging to us so long as we were fighting in a common cause. But as soon as the war is over, and our present ally is free to indulge her aggressive ambitions for conquest, then we must look out. There is no denying that large numbers have come to believe that there is real danger here. Let us try to see what are the facts in the case.

First of all, have we any reason to believe that Japan wants the Philippines? Her leading men have said numberless times that she does not. The location of the islands is in the tropics. But the Japanese people are accustomed to a temperate climate, and do not like a tropical. So there is reason to believe that they would not go to the Philippines in any considerable numbers to settle even if the nation possessed them. They have far better opportunities in Korea and Manchuria. But if there were little or no settlement of Japanese in the Philippines, what benefit could Japan derive from them. If they have been an expense to the United States, could they be anything else but an expense to her?

Again, could Japan take them from us by force, even if she wanted to? Of course, she would first have to sink our fleet, which is from two to three times as strong as her own. Furthermore, the islands are strongly fortified; the fortifications which we have built on Corregidor, guarding Manila Bay, are among the most perfect and powerful in the world.

And even if by some sudden stroke she were able to capture Manila, the capital city, that would mean little, for she would still have before her the gigantic task of subduing the islands, in which undertaking she would be compelled to fight, not only the United States, but the whole Filipino people. After her long and trying experience in Formosa we may be sure that she will

not be eager to attempt the same kind of thing on a larger scale in the Philippines.

But the main thing is that whether she were able to capture the Philippines or not, if she made the attempt, that would be war with us; and that would mean conflict with a nation possessed of such resources in men, munitions and money that there could be only one possible outcome to it. In the end the war would go against her. She would have to give up the islands, even if for a time she had held them by the power of her guns. America would fight with an energy that nothing could withstand, and for years if necessary, and if necessary would sink half her enormous wealth in building fleets and equipping armies, rather than suffer a foot of soil above which our flag floated to be torn from her by force.

In such a war both nations would lose vast treasure. Both would pour out nobody can tell how much blood. Hate which generations of time could not overcome would be kindled between two great peoples that ought to be friends forever. There would be much suffering here, but not a tenth part as much as in Japan. She would lose her commerce. Her manufactures would be paralyzed. She would be plunged into bankruptcy. Her people would starve. And all for what? For nothing, and worse than nothing!

Does any sane man believe that the Japanese people today or tomorrow or in a thousand years will elect to plunge into such a sea of horrors and of ruin for the sake of trying to seize a group of islands which they well know they cannot get any possession of that will be permanent, and which if obtained would be to them a perpetual expense, burden, anxiety and peril?

Charles Lamb's Chinaman, burning down his house to roast a pig would be a paragon of wisdom compared with any Japanese general or admiral or statesman who would advocate burning down the edifice of his nation's present splendid strength and prosperity for the sake of stealing from a friendly sister nation something which would be at best of only doubtful value if obtained, and which would make that nation, the most powerful in the world, her deadly enemy.

This, then, is one side of the Philippine matter. Japan is not going to take our islands from us, or make any attempt to do so. If any among us has dreamed such nightmare dreams we may dismiss them and be at rest.

But there is another side to the matter that is not a phantasy. This side must be faced, and we want to know how to face it wisely. The Philippines are in our possession, and will remain so until we ourselves dispose of them. What are we going to do with them?

Would it be a loss to us as a nation if they should pass out of our possession? If so, in what respect?

Leading men among us of all parties do not hesitate today to confess that from the beginning these islands have been to us financially an expense and militarily a danger. When, excited by the militaristic fever and the expansionist ambition that swept over the nation in connection with the Spanish War, we seized those remote possessions and imposed upon them our rule, contrary to the will of their people, we thought, perhaps incidentally, that we were doing something for